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Forthwith Service, Rule 4(m) and the Maritime 
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Suits in Admiralty Acti (SAA) conditionally allows 
plaintiffs to sue the United States in admiralty. One condition 
to this allowance is that plaintiffs "forthwith" serve their 
admiralty complaints on the United States.2 At first glance, 
* This Comment was prepared in the wake of an internship with the gov-
ernment office responsible for representing the United States in all admiralty ac-
tions-the Admiralty & Aviation Litigation Section, Torts Branch, Department of 
Justice, Washington, D.C. It does not pretend, however, to represent the views, 
official or otherwise, of that office. 
1 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (1988) (amending ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (1920)) 
(waiving sovereign immunity in admiralty actions, thus placing the United States 
under the same admiralty law liabilities as any private shipowner, with two 
exceptions: one, United States vessels could be neither seized nor arrested; two, 
actions against the United States only would be allowed to proceed in personam); 
see 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-90 (1988) (amending the Public Vessels Act, ch. 428, 43 
Stat. 1112 (1925)) (providing a remedy against the United States personally for 
actions arising from the operation of public vessels; and, in § 782, adopting the 
conditions and procedural mechanisms of the SAA); see also 1 MARTIN J. NORRIS, 
THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 8:1-2 (4th ed. 1990); 2 MARTIN J. 
NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 28:1 (4th ed. 1985) (discussing the background and 
scope of the SAA). 
2 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (commanding the admiralty plaintiff to "forthwith 
serve a copy of his [or her] libel on the United States .... "); Libby v. United 
States, 840 F.2d 818, 820 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that "the conditions contained 
in § 742 [of the SAA], including the forthwith service requirement, are necessary 
terms of the government's consent to be sued"); Watts v. Pinkney, 752 F.2d 406, 
408 (9th Cir. 1985); Amelia v. United States, 732 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Kenyon v. United States, 676 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1981) (declaring that the 
"congressional command of § 742 [regarding forthwith service) is a condition 
precedent to the congressional waiver of . . . sovereign immunity"); City of New 
York v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 278 F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. dismissed, 
371 U.S. 907 (affirming that even "technical requirements for service of process 
upon the government, when it has waived sovereign immunity, must be strictly 
complied with"). Contra Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 
772 F.2d 62, 63-66 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that § 742's forthwith service 
requirement has been superseded by the 120 day service limit of Rule 4(m) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see Gregory J. Ressa, Note, Rule 4(j) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Forthwith Service Requirement of the 
Suits in Admiralty Act, FORDHAM L. REV. 1195 (1986) (arguing that § 742's 
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the way this condition works is simple: "No forthwith service, 
no admiralty action."3 Closer scutiny, however, reveals the 
forthwith service condition to be all but simple. 
To begin with, there is the problem of determining when 
service is sufficiently forthwith, since the SAA does not define 
forthwith. From a plain language standpoint, forthwith means 
immediately, now, straightaway, without delay, promptly, and 
with all reasonable dispatch.4 Thus, the admiralty plaintiff 
might safely assume that service on the day of or just after 
filing would be sufficiently forthwith. But what about service 
after 2, 15, 30, 45, 60, or 120 days? As it turns out, the courts 
are relatively clear about the smaller and the larger time 
periods-2, 15, 60 and 120 days. The smaller time periods 
generally count as forthwith, the larger ones generally do not.5 
forthwith service requirement is no longer a condition on a plaintiff's right to sue 
the United States in admiralty because that requirement is superseded by the 
service limit of Rule 4(m)). 
Caveat: The United States typically raises the 'failure to serve forthwith' 
defense in the form of a Rule 12(b)(1), FED. R. CIV. P., lack of jurisdiction motion 
and does so, if at all, as its response to the admiralty plaintiff's complaint. E.g., 
infra, at note 7 (most of the cases in this list involved a United States' 12(b)(1) 
motion made in lieu of an answer to the original complaint). 
3 Appellee's Brief at 15, Landry v. United States, No. 93-4351, 1994 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7656 (5th Cir. Mar. 29, 1994). 
4 See, e.g., BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 492 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 654 (6th ed. 1990); 37 C.J.S. Forthwith § 1 (1953 & Supp. 1992); 
WILUAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 233 (Steven C. De Costa et al. eds., 2d ed. 
1992); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 558 (Jess Stan 
& Laurence Urdang eds., 1983); WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGAL THESAURUs' 
DICTIONARY 335 (West 1985); WEBSTER'S TIDRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
895 (Philip B. Gove et al. eds., 1971); 17 WORDS & PHRASES Forthwith 605-633 
(perm. ed. & Supp. 1993). 
5 Smaller time periods found to be forthwith: Libby, 840 F.2d at 821 (24 
days); Phillips v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 629 F. Supp. 967, 971 (S. D. 
Miss. 1986) (52 days, because the United States received constructive notice ten 
days after initial filing); Gajewski v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 381, 384-385 
(C.D.N.Y 1982) (18 days). 
Larger time periods found not to be forthwith: Watts, 752 F.2d at 408 (33 
months); Amelia, 732 F.2d at 713 (63 days); Kenyon, 676 F.2d at 1231 (60 days); 
Barrie v. United States, 615 F.2d 829, 830 (9th Cir. 1980) (64 days); Owens v. 
United States, 541 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir. 1976) (58 days), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 
945 (1977); Battaglia v. United States, 303 F.2d 683, 685-86 (2d Cir.) 
(approximately 135 days), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 907 (1962); McAllister Brothers, 
278 F.2d at 710 (over 60 days); O'Halloran v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 829, 
831-33 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (77 days); Hall v. Maritime Administration, 1993 WL 
139507, at *2 (E.D. La. April 27, 1993) (126 days); Landry v. United States, 815 F. 
Supp. 1000, 1003 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (110 days), affd, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7656 
(5th Cir. March 29, 1994); Erdman v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 713 F. Supp. 706, 
709 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (80 days); Pezzola v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 544, 544-48 
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But what about the middle, thirty to fifty day range? Research 
turned up no cases in this range. Thus, if the admiralty 
plaintiff serves her admiralty complaint on the United States 
during this range, she has little, if any, assurance that she has 
complied with the SAA's forthwith service condition. 
In 1983, Rule 4(m) was added to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.6 This new federal civil rule specified an expandable 
120 day service period in admiralty cases involving the United 
States. 7 At the time this new rule was propounded, some 
admiralty plaintiffs may have assumed that the new rule's 
expandable 120 day service period superseded the SAA's 
somewhat wooden forthwith service condition-along with that 
condition's middle range ambiguities. But such an assumption 
would have been not only overly optimistic, but also premature. 
Of the circuits which concern themselves regularly with 
admiralty questions, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
did not allow the new uniform service period to supersede the 
SAA's forthwith service condition.8 Only the Third Circuit has 
(C.D.N.Y. 1985) (over 365 days); Halperlin v. United States, 610 F. Supp. 8, 12-13 
(S.D. Fla. 1985) (93 days); Brown v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 472, 474 (C.D. 
Cal. 1975) (over 240 days); Glover v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 
1952) (approximately 305 days); Marich v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 829, 832 
(N.D. Cal. 1949) (over 365 days); Bans v. United States, 1988 A.M.C. 2547 (D. 
Mass. 1988) (188 days); Lee v. United States, 1983 A.M.C. 65, 66 (N.D. Cal. 1982) 
(70 days); Moore v. United States, 1978 A.M.C. 815, 816 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (over 90 
days); Smyer v. United States, 1978 A.M.C. 817, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (98 days); 
Orpen v. United States, 1973 A.M.C. 914, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (approximately 335 
days). 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). This rule was previously located at FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(j). The rule is found at its current location as a result of 1993 amendments to 
the federal procedural rules. The reader will note that, while materials cited in 
this Comment refer internally to the rule at its previous location, this Comment 
refers to the rule at its new location and infers that materials cited intend 
reference to the rule at its present location. 
7 This service period can be expanded either by the plaintiff's motion under 
Rule 6(b), FED. R. CIV. P., or by failing to serve within Rule 4(m)'s 120 day service 
period and then showing "good cause" for such failure. 128 CONG. REC. H9851-52 
(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982), reprinted in JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, FEDERAL CIVIL RULES, pt. 1, § 4.2[3] (1993). The 1993 amendment to 
Rule 4(m) allows the court to extend the service period without a showing of good 
cause. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) advisory committee's notes, reprinted in JAMES W. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, FEDERAL CML RULES, pt. 1, § 4.1[2] 
(1994). This new provision of Rule 4(m) will come to bear on this Comment's 
analysis at a later stage. 
8 Libby, 840 F.2d at 820; Watts, 752 F.2d at 408; Amella, 732 F.2d at 712; 
Kenyon, 676 F.2d at 1231; McAllister Bros., 278 F.2d at 710. 
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allowed such a result. 9 The Fifth Circuit has, rather 
remarkably, remained mostly silent on this issue. 10 
Which of the circuits, if any, is right about the effect of 
Rule 4(m) on the SAA's forthwith service condition? For the 
benefit of the admiralty plaintiff, this Comment attempts to 
answer this question. To do so, this Comment analyzes two key 
cases on point, Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River 
Towing, Inc., n a Third Circuit case holding that Rule 4(m) 
supersedes the SAA's forthwith service condition, and Libby v. 
9 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 63-6. But cf Libby, 840 F.2d at 820-
21 (holding that, while Rule 4(m)'s 120 day service period does not supersede the 
forthwith service condition, it may nevertheless act as a "benchmark" in 
determining what qualifies as forthwith); see NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME 
PERSONAL INJURIES § 8:4 (4th ed. 1990) (misconstruing Libby as holding that Rule 
4(m) supersedes the forthwith service condition; a discussion making this 
misconstrual more obvious follows below). 
10 The Fifth Circuit has not, however, been altogether silent. In one 
unpublished case, the Fifth Circuit appeared to hold that forthwith service was 
still a condition which had to be met in order for the court to have jurisdiction 
over the sovereign. K.ieu v. United States, 1993 A.M.C. 1789, 1790-92 (5th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Amella, 732 F.2d at 730) (holding that plaintiff never properly 
served the United States and, impliedly, that plaintiff did not serve forthwith as 
required by § 742 of the SAA; stating that "'[f]ailure to comply with the forthwith 
service demand of §742 [sic] is a jurisdictional defect which denies a court subject 
matter jurisdiction in the controversy'"). Two further points are noteworthy here. 
First, the Fifth Circuit chose not to publish Kieu, because it regarded forthwith 
service "as a well-settled principle of law." 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1. Second, if this 
interpretation of Kieu is correct, then the Fifth Circuit, while not addressing the 
Rule 4(m) question directly, has set a precedent regarding whether or not the 
forthwith service condition has been superseded by another of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (Rule 15(c)). Under local Fifth Circuit rules, unpublished cases do 
have precedential value. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3. 
Since Kieu, two Fifth Circuit district courts' decisions have held that the 
forthwith service condition remains unaffected by the presence of Rule 4(m), while 
two others have held the opposite, i.e., that the forthwith service condition has 
been superseded. See Hall v. United States, No. CIV.A. 92-3020, 1993 WL 139507, 
at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 1993); Landry, 815 F. Supp. at 1002-3 (both holding that 
the forthwith service conditions still applies). But see Holmberg v. OMI Ship 
Management, Inc., No. CIV.A. 92-3749, 1993 WL 165774, at *1-2 (E.D. La. May 6, 
1993); Estain v. United States, No. CIV.A. 92-479, 1992 WL 125348, at *1-2 (E.D. 
La. June 2, 1992) (both holding that the forthwith service condition has been 
superseded). 
Prior to Kieu, at least three Fifth Circuit opinions seemed to adopt the Third 
Circuit's Jones & Laughlin Steel pro-Rule 4(m)/anti-forthwith service position. 
Diversified Marine International, Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 
(E.D. La. 1991); Farnsworth v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., No. CIV.A. 87-5954, 1989 
WL 20544, at *1 (E.D. La. March 7, 1989); Phillips, 629 F. Supp. at 971. 
11 772 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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United States/2 an Eleventh Circuit case holding the contrary. 
This Comment then discusses how these two cases, taken 
together, suggest a new argument for undoing the SAA's 
forthwith service condition. Finally, this Comment concludes 
that, at least until such time as Rule 4(m) unambiguously 
carries the day, admiralty plaintiffs would do well to serve 
their admiralty complaints on the United States "forthwith", 
that is, on the same day they file them or very soon 
thereafter. 13 
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT ARGUMENT AGAINST FORTHWITH 
SERVICE 
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Third Circuit decided that 
the Rule 4(m)'s service period superseded the SAA's forthwith 
service condition to the maritime waiver of sovereign 
immunity. 14 
A. Facts of the Case 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Engineers}-ultimately 
the United States, appellee-operates the Maxwell Lock and 
Dam, located on the Monongahela River in Fayette County, 
Pennsylvania. 15 Downstream from this dam, appellant Jones 
& Laughlin Steel, Inc. (J&L) operates a preparation plant 
which relies on the Monongahela's water level for transporta-
tion purposes. 16 In January of 1982, an empty barge belonging 
to appellee Mon River Towing Company, Inc. (Mon River), 
"broke free, floated down river, and lodged in an open gate at 
the dam."17 In order to dislodge this empty barge from the 
open gate at the dam, the Engineers found it necessary to low-
12 840 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1988). 
13 The difficulties involved in serving this way are minimal. Instructions on 
how to serve the United States are easy to come by. See 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1988); 
FED R. CIV. P. 4(i) (both giving detailed instructions on how to serve the United 
States). 
Caveat: The United States has not been served for the purposes of the 
forthwith service condition until both the local United States Attorney and the U.S. 
Attorney General have been properly served. Amella, 732 F.2d at 712; Battaglia v. 
United States, 303 F.2d 683, 685-86 (2d. Cir 1962); Rodriguez v. Tisch, 688 F. 
Supp. 1530, 1531 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
14 772 F.2d at 63-66. 
15 !d. at 63. 
16 !d. 
17 !d. 
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er the Monongahela's water level. 18 This action on the part of 
the Engineers caused the downstream J&L plant to suffer an 
economic loss. 19 
In January of 1984, prior to the running of the SAA's two-
year statute of limitations,20 and after realizing the unlikeli-
hood of recovery vis a vis administrative channels, J &L filed an 
admiralty complaint against the United States and Mon River 
in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.21 The day after filing this complaint, J&L 
served its summons and complaint on the Engineers at their 
offices in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.22 Two months later, an 
Assistant United States Attorney sent J&L a letter informing 
J&L that, in order for its suit to proceed, it would need to com-
ply with the instructions of the federal procedural rules re-
specting both timely service23 and the method for effecting 
service on the United States.24 Days later and before the end 
of the 120 day service period, J&L served the United States as 
directed by the Assistant United States Attorney's letter.25 
The United States then had a sudden change of heart and 
took the position that it should be dismissed from the action, 
based on the following two-step argument: step one, the sole 
basis for jurisdiction in the suit against the United States was 
the SAA; step two, by failing properly to serve the United 
States until two months after filing its complaint, J&L failed to 
serve the United States forthwith as jurisdictionally required 
by § 7 42 of the SAA. 26 This change of position raised for the 
18 ld. 
19 ld. 
20 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1988). 
21 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 63. 
22 ld. 
23 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (formerly 4(j)). 
24 ld.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i) (formerly 4(d)(4)). 
25 ld. 
26 ld. at 63-64. This particular paragraph (the paragraph in which the Third 
Circuit notes this quick change in the United States' position) seems to be the key 
paragraph in Jones & Laughlin Steel. In this paragraph, the Third Circuit reveals 
its disgust for the United States' quick change in position regarding the applicabili-
ty of Rule 4(m); that is, for the United States' willingness, first to lead J&L down 
the primrose path of believing that the Federal Rules were controlling with respect 
to service issues, then suddenly to switch service laws on J&L when it was too 
late for J&L to do anything about it, when their claim would be time-barred if dis-
missed. For, by this time in the action the SAA's two year statute limitations had 
run, so that if J&L was dismissed for service reasons, it would have, for intents 
and purposes, been dismissed with prejudice. 
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first time, in the district as well as in the Third Circuit, the 
issue of whether or not Rule 4(m) supersedes the forthwith ser-
vice condition of§ 742 of the SAA. Looking to the Second and 
Ninth Circuits for guidance,27 the district court then adopted 
the United States' position and dismissed the United States 
from the action. 28 When J &L appealed the Third Circuit re-
versed, holding that Rule 4(m) supersedes the forthwith service 
condition of the SAA.29 
B. Reasoning of the Court 
Reduced to propositional form, the Third Circuit's argu-
ment in favor of Rule 4(m) works as follows: 
1. Under the Rules Enabling Act,30 Rule 4(m) supersedes 
any inconsistent federal procedural laws;31 
2. The SAA's forthwith service condition is a federal proce-
dural (and merely procedural) law;32 
27 See Kenyon, 676 F.2d at 1231; McAllister Bros., 278 F.2d at 710. 
28 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 64. 
29 !d. at 66. 
30 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988) (amending ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)) (autho-
rizing, inter alia, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see Stephen B. Brockbank, 
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015-1197 (1982) (providing a 
thorough history and background on the Act); see also 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL. 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.02 (1993) (briefly reviewing the history and effect 
of the Act). 
31 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 66; see Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S-
.C. § 2072 (1988) (declaring that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules [as are en-
abled by this act, e.g., Rule 4(m)] shall be of no further force or effect after such 
rules have taken effect"). 
32 !d. at 65-66 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 743 (1988), which declares that admi-
ralty actions against the United States permitted under the SAA "shall proceed 
and shall be heard and determined according to the principles of law and to the 
rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties," and, thus, imply-
ing that the SAA did not intend to give the United States a special procedural, 
hypertechnical defense otherwise not available "in like cases between private par-
ties"). The Third Circuit here relied on the twin arguments of Judges Friendly and 
Boochever who disagreed with the case law in their own respective circuits, the 
Second and the Ninth, regarding whether or not the SAA's forthwith service condi-
tion was indeed a condition. See Battaglia, 303 F.2d at 686-87 (Friendly, J., con-
curring) (expressing the opinion that once the United States, in the first two sen-
tences of 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1988), grants its general maritime waiver of sovereign 
immunity, maritime actions against the United States, at least with respect to pro-
cedural questions, proceed as if brought against a private admiralty defendant); 
Kenyon, 676 F.2d at 1231-32 (Boochever, J., concurring) (arguing along similar lines 
as Judge Friendly in Battaglia and indicating that the SAA's forthwith service lan-
guage was in fact intended only as a technical, procedural apparatus for dealing 
with suits in admiralty brought against the United States under the SAA and 
that, after the adoption of the uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966, 
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3. The SAA's forthwith service condition is inconsistent with 
Rule 4(m);33 (1 & 2) 
4. Hence, Rule 4(m) supersedes the SAA's forthwith service 
condition.34 (1 & 3) 
Using principles of formal logic, it will be possible to ana-
lyze quickly the Third Circuit's argument. Of course, as is ap-
parent, the Third Circuit's argument is deductively valid, 
meaning that if all of its premises are true, then its conclusion 
must also be true. But a deductively valid argument is not 
necessarily a sound or true argument. In order to deny the 
conclusion of a valid argument, it must be shown that at least 
one of the argument's premises is false. Assuming for the mo-
ment then that the conclusion of the Third Circuit's argument 
is false, it will be of some value to determine which of the 
argument's premises is most likely to be false. 
Given the statutory foundation of premise number one and 
the conclusory nature of premise number three, the obvious 
candidate for falsehood is premise number two-the premise in 
which the Third Circuit opines the SAA's forthwith service 
condition to be merely procedural. It is with this premise that 
the Eleventh Circuit expressly disagrees with the Third Circuit. 
For further commentary on the Third Circuit's argument then, 
it will be useful to examine the Eleventh Circuit's argument. 
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF 
FORTHWITH SERVICE 
In Libby v. United States,35 the Eleventh Circuit expressly 
disagreed with the Third Circuit's decision in Jones & Laughlin 
Steel, and decided that Rule 4(m)'s service period did not and 
could not supersede the SAA's forthwith service condition to 
maritime waiver of sovereign immunity.36 
especially with respect to admiralty actions, such an apparatus might well be sup-
plemented, if not made obsolete, by the uniform Federal Rules). Both Judge 
Friendly and Judge Boochever, however, declined to break totally with that case 
law on stare decisis grounds. 
33 See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 772 F.2d at 63-66. Although the court never 
directly states this premise of this argument, the premise may be implied from the 
facts as an enthymeme of the court's argument. 
34 !d. 
35 840 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1988). 
36 !d. at 820-21. 
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A. Facts of the Case 
In March of 1984, Michael Libby (Libby) was injured while 
working aboard a vessel belonging to the United States.37 In 
March of 1986, one day before the running of the SAA's two 
year statute of limitations,38 Libby filed an admiralty action 
against the United States in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Florida.39 Twenty-four days later, 
Libby completed service on the United States.40 In response to 
this twenty-four day "delay" in service, the United States 
moved to be dismissed on the grounds that Libby had failed to 
serve forthwith as required by§ 742 of the SAAY 
The Middle District, apparently not impressed with the 
United States' Draconian interpretation of forthwith service, 
denied the United States' motion and held instead that the 
expandable 120 day service period established by Rule 4(m) 
superseded the SAA's forthwith service condition.42 On appeal, 
the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the lower 
court, holding that Rule 4(m)'s service period did not and could 
not supersede the SAA's ''jurisdictional" forthwith service condi-
tion.43 The Eleventh Circuit, however, went on to affirm the 
district court's result, holding, inter alia, that service twenty-
four days after filing was sufficiently forthwith.44 
B. Reasoning of the Court 
Reduced to propositional form, the Eleventh Circuit's argu-
ment in favor of forthwith service looks like this: 
5. Under the Rules Enabling Act, Rule 4(m) may not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive or jurisdictional right. 45 
37 !d. at 819. 
38 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1988); see Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 782 
(19R8) (adopting, inter alia, the SAA's forthwith service condition). 
39 Libby, 840 F.2d at 819. 
40 !d. 
41 !d. As in note 28, supra, this part of the case seems to be the turning 
point for the United States. Perhaps if the United States had refrained from em-
ploying the forthwith service defense after being served only 24 days after filing, 
the Eleventh Circuit would never have announced its "benchmark" theory for deter-
mining what service amounts to forthwith service. As is explained later, it is this 
benchmark theory which may ultimately undo the United States' forthwith service 
defense altogether. 
42 !d. 
43 !d. at 820-21. 
44 !d. at 821-22. 
45 !d. at 820; see Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988) (stating 
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6. In addition to whatever procedural functions it performs, 
the SAA's forthwith service condition involves at least these 
three substantive and jurisdictional rights:46 
(a) The sovereign's absolute substantive right to condi-
tion its waivers of sovereign immunity;47 
(b) The admiralty plaintiff's conditional substantive 
right to sue the sovereign;48 and 
(c) The federal judiciary's conditional jurisdiction over 
the sovereign. 49 
7. Allowing Rule 4(m) to supersede the SAA's forthwith ser-
vice condition results in: 
(a) an abridgement of the sovereign's absolute substan-
tive right to condition its waivers of sovereign immunity 
(i.e., the sovereign could be sued despite the fact that 
one of the conditions to its maritime waiver-forthwith 
service-has not been met);50 
(b) an enlargement of the admiralty plaintiff's condi-
tional substantive right to sue the sovereign (i.e., the 
admiralty plaintiff would be allowed to sue the sovereign 
without complying with all of the sovereign's condi-
tions-conditions which include forthwith service);51 
and 
(c) a modification of the federal judiciary's conditional 
jurisdiction over the sovereign (i.e., the federal judiciary 
that the Federal "[R]ules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right"); see also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941); United States v. 
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589-90 (both stating that, when the Rules Enabling Act 
prohibits the Federal Rules from abridging, enlarging or modifying substantive 
rights, it also intends to prohibit the Federal Rules from abridging, enlarging or 
modifying the jurisdiction of the federal courts); see FED. R. Crv. P. 82 (recognizing 
Sibbach and Sherwood principle that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not to 
extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
46 As the Third Circuit did in Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Eleventh Circuit 
in Libby took an interest in the location of the SAA's forthwith service language 
within the Act. The Eleventh Circuit found that, because the forthwith service 
language was in the SAA section that actually announced and defmed the mari-
time waiver of sovereign immunity, § 742, rather than in the SAA's procedural 
matters section, § 743, it was only correct to interpret the forthwith service lan-
guage as being part of the waiver and, therefore, jurisdictional. 840 F.2d at 820. 
47 Libby, 840 F.2d at 820. 
48 !d. 
49 !d. at 820-21 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 
(1980)). 
50 !d. 
51 !d. 
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would be allowed to hail the sovereign into court without 
enforcing all of the conditions of the sovereign's mari-
time waiver of immunity).52 (5 & 6) 
8. Hence, Rule 4(m) may not supersede the SAA's forthwith 
service condition to the maritime waiver of sovereign immuni-
ty.53 (6 & 7) 
527 
The Eleventh Circuit's argument is deductively valid. It is 
in premise number six-the premise in which a substantive 
and jurisdictional role is suggested for the SAA's forthwith 
service condition-that the Eleventh Circuit parts ways with 
the Third Circuit. 
Not surprisingly, this point of departure happens at the 
most vulnerable part of the argument. For, if there is a doubt-
ful premise in the Eleventh Circuit's argument it is premise 
six. This is true for reasons similar to those described above 
regarding the doubtfulness of premise two. Premise five is well 
founded in the plain language of the Rules Enabling Act. Prem-
ise seven is a conclusion based on premises five and six. Prem-
ise six involves the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the 
SAA, an interpretation directly at odds with that of the Third 
Circuit. 
The Third Circuit, as expressed in premise two, believes 
that the SAA's forthwith service condition is merely procedural 
and, therefore, that Rule 4(m) supersedes that condition by 
virtue of the Rules Enabling Act. The Eleventh Circuit, as 
expressed in premise six, believes that, in addition to any pro-
cedural function it may serve, the SAA's forthwith service con-
dition has substantive as well as jurisdictional content and, 
hence, that the Rules Enabling Act prevents Rule 4(m) from 
changing that condition in any way. Apparently, the Third and 
Eleventh Circuits are stalemated. They would be, except for the 
fact that after giving the appearance of favoring the SAA's 
forthwith service condition, the Eleventh Circuit went on clev-
erly to undermine the forthwith service condition by suggesting 
a new theory for determining when service is forthwith. 
52 ld. 
53 ld. at 821. 
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C. The Eleventh Circuit's Argument Against Forthwith 
Service 
To its conclusion upholding the SAA's forthwith service 
condition, the Eleventh Circuit added this proviso: that, while 
Rule 4(m) did not and could not supersede the SAA's forthwith 
service condition, it might well serve as a "benchmark" for 
determining when service is forthwith. 54 In effect, the Elev-
enth Circuit offered this new premise: 
9. Nothing prevents the court from using Rule 4(m)'s service 
period as a ''benchmark" for determining what constitutes 
forthwith service in a contemporary litigation setting. 
This new ''benchmark" premise appears to be what the 
admiralty plaintiff has been waiting for: a readily comprehensi-
ble, straightforward statement of what the SAA's forthwith 
service condition actually requires. What this new premise 
means, at least on its face and as applied in Libby, is that, if 
the admiralty plaintiff serves the United States within the time 
allowed by Rule 4(m), then the admiralty plaintiff probably 
serves forthwith. 55 When combined with premises one through 
eight above, this premise means that, whether or not the SAA's 
forthwith service condition is merely procedural or has substan-
tive, jurisdictional content, Rule 4(m) applies, either directly or 
as an afterthought. This would be true whether it supersedes 
the SAA's obsolete forthwith service condition (as in the Third 
Circuit) or because it serves as a benchmark in the determina-
54 840 F.2d at 821. 
55 As noted earlier, Rule 4(m)'s 120 day service period is expandable. It 
would be pure speculation and beyond the scope of this Comment to guess what 
the Eleventh Circuit might do in the situation where the admiralty plaintiff serves 
the United States after the 120 days but within an allowable expanded period, say 
a period of 150 days with a showing of good cause. One could argue that the Elev-
enth Circuit's preference in this matter would be as follows: keep things simple 
and uniform; if it is good enough for Rule 4(m), it ought to be good enough for 
forthwith service. There is no good reason for setting up jurisdictional traps in 
which to snare unwitting admiralty plaintiffs. However, the most recently amended 
version of the 120 day rule suggests that this reasoning may be overly generous. 
The amended rule allows the court to expand the service period on its own motion 
and without any showing of good cause. Based on the reasoning above, this would 
mean, at least from the Government's perspective, that a federal court would have 
the power, as a matter of discretion, to expand its jurisdiction over the United 
States in admiralty actions, a result prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act and the 
federal procedural rules themselves. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988); FED R. CIV. P. 82. 
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tion of when the SAA's forthwith service condition has been 
satisfied (as in the Eleventh Circuit). 
The admiralty plaintiff, however, is not yet in a position to 
be at ease in assuming that mere compliance with Rule 4(m)'s 
service limit will render service on the United States forthwith 
as required by the SAA. The Eleventh Circuit merely said that 
Rule 4(m)'s uniform service period might properly serve as a 
benchmark in determining when service is forthwith. It did not 
say that Rule 4(m)'s service limit would serve as a benchmark. 
Nor did it say that Rule 4(m)'s service limit would serve as the 
benchmark. In short, the Eleventh Circuit left open the pos-
sibility that other benchmarks might still exist, including those 
established in earlier, albeit inadequate jurispru-
dence-jurisprudence which failed to offer the admiralty plain-
tiff assurances in the middle or thirty to fifty days range. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Third Circuit takes one of 
the possible approaches to solving the forthwith service prob-
lem. The Third Circuit declared the SAA's forthwith service 
condition merely procedural and, by that means, allowed Rule 
4(m)'s service limit to supersede the SAA's forthwith service 
condition as required by the Rules Enabling Act. In order to 
follow the Third Circuit's approach, a court would have to over-
look significant jurisprudence holding the forthwith service con-
dition to be more than merely procedural. 
In Libby, the Eleventh Circuit takes the benchmark ap-
proach to solving the forthwith service problem, preventing 
Rule 4(m)'s service limit from undermining the SAA's forthwith 
service condition, but nonetheless allowing Rule 4(m) to operate 
as a criterion in the determination of when an admiralty 
plaintiff's service on the United States satisfies the condition. 
The benchmark approach, of course, avoids the problems in-
volved in overlooking significant jurisprudence on point. For 
circuits such as the Second and the Ninth, which hold the 
forthwith service condition to be at least partly jurisdictional, 
the Eleventh Circuit's benchmark approach offers a possibility 
for changing course on the forthwith service issue without 
overtuming circuit precedent. To make the benchmark ap-
proach work as desired, and to make the service standard for 
plaintiffs suing the United States in admiralty completely un-
ambiguous, however, the service limit of Rule 4(m) must be 
recognized as the only criterion for determining when service 
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qualifies as service forthwith. Such a holding, however, could 
be undesirable, if the result thereof was tantamount to grant-
ing the federal courts discretionary power to enlarge their ad-
miralty jurisdiction over the United States-especially in cases 
where no showing of good cause for tardy service is provided, 
as unamended Rule 4(m) strictly required. If this were the 
result, then it would have to be said that Rule 4(m) did what 
the Rules Enabling Act and Rule 82 forbade: namely, that Rule 
4(m) modified the substantive rights of both the sovereign and 
admiralty plaintiffs and enlarged the admiralty jurisdiction of 
the federal courts over the sovereign. 
A parting word to the wise: At least until such a time as 
Rule 4(m) unambiguously carries the day, admiralty plaintiffs 
would be well-advised to serve their admiralty complaints on 
the United States "forthwith"-on the day of filing or very soon 
thereafter. 
James David Phipps 
